We address the persistent reverse causality problem in estimating the causal effect of female labor force participation (FLFP) on corruption. Employing plow usage as an instrumental variable, an increase in FLFP by one standard deviation is suggested to improve the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI, ranging from zero to ten) by 0.52 points. This effect is stronger than a one standard deviation change of education levels, government size, or ethnic fractionalization.
Introduction
Studies have suggested a greater participation of women in society to be correlated with lower corruption levels (Dollar et al., 2001; Swamy et al., 2001) . Consistent with these findings, numerous governments have turned to policies intended to raise the participation of women in politics and the workforce, such as gender quotas or gender equality laws. However, the gender-corruption link remains inherently plagued by simultaneity concerns. Corrupt societies may themselves prevent women from entering the labor force (e.g., "old boy networks," see Sundström, 2011 , for a discussion). Thus, isolating a causal relationship remains difficult in a standard regression framework. This paper employs plow usage as an instrumental variable, predicting the FLFP rate. Following Alesina et al. (2013) , usage of the plow centuries ago has been shown to affect FLFP today, but is likely unrelated to other contemporary characteristics, such as economic development or corruption. Indeed, the instrument proves to be a strong predictor of FLFP and the link between gender and corruption is confirmed once simultaneity concerns are addressed. 1 We are grateful to Alejandra Montoya Agudelo for excellent comments and discussions. 
Data and Methodology
Our data comes from standard sources for cross-country variables, displayed in Table 1 . Following the majority of the associated literature, we use the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), derived from surveys and private risk assessments, to measure corruption. 4 We control for the standard set of covariates that have consistently been linked to corruption (Treisman, 2000; Serra, 2006) . Alesina et al. (2013) Plow, positive crops (0 -1) 0.505 (0.404) Alesina et al. (2013) Variables defining FLFP and the associated instrumental variables are taken from Alesina et al. (2013) . Specifically, we employ those historical variables as instruments that have been shown to influence FLFP today: plow usage, the presence of large animals, economic complexity, political hierarchies, agricultural suitability, and tropical climate. Alesina et al. (2013, pp.470/471) explain that in plow-using societies, "[m]en tended to work outside the home in the fields, while women specialized in activities within the home. This division of labor then generated norms about the appropriate role of women in society." As a result, cultural beliefs about the role of women persist until today, generating a negative relationship between traditional plow usage and FLFP. 4 Measurement of the CPI changes after 2011, making values incomparable to previous observations. Further, Alesina et al. (2013) provide evidence that plow usage has affected cultural beliefs independent of surrounding institutions and economic development. For example, US immigrants from plow-using countries continue to hold their beliefs about gender roles, even after living under foreign institutions and economic conditions.
These results provide robust intuitive support for the instruments' validity and excludability. In addition, our empirical results are accompanied by the corresponding test statistics. FLFP is positively associated with the absence of corruption -a result that is statistically relevant on the one percent level. After incorporating all controls, the coefficient reduces marginally to 0.027. Taken literally, a one standard deviation increase in the FLFP rate would relate to a 0.47 point increase of the CPI, roughly equivalent to the difference between corruption in Spain (CPI of 6.66) and Japan (7.11).
Empirical Findings

Results from OLS Estimations
Results from IV Estimations
However, if simultaneity is indeed present between FLFP and corruption, the results from Table 2 should not be interpreted as causal. For example, countries that exhibit strong levels of corruption may actively prevent women from entering the workforce, retaining patriarchal structures. In that case, reverse causality would bias the coefficient on FLFP in Table 2 upwards. Table 3 introduces the variables associated with plow usage as instruments for FLFP. Column (1) presents the most basic estimation, where the suggested determinants of FLFP from Alesina et al. (2013) are used to predict the share of women in the labor force. In addition, we control for income levels -arguably the most persistent determinant in this literature (Treisman, 2007) . The derived coefficient for FLFP retains its positive sign and magnitude with a value of 0.029. The respective econometric tests confirm the validity of the instrumental variables (e.g., F-values over 10 are considered strong instruments, following Stock and Yogo, 2005) . Further, overidentification does not seem to be an issue.
Adding the corresponding control variables in columns (2) and (3) Note that, in the 3SLS estimations, testing for joint significance of the corresponding instruments in the FLFP equation returns an F-value of 8.31 -just under the respective threshold of ten (Stock and Yogo, 2005) . A closer look reveals that the variable large animals is not statistically significant on conventional levels in the first-stage estimations in equations (4) and (5). Re-estimating these equations without that variable returns virtually the same coefficient for FLFP (0.030, not displayed) with the F-test for weak instruments producing a value of 10.15.
Conclusions
Using historical plow prevalence as a plausible instrument for FLFP today, our analysis is able to alleviate simultaneity concerns in estimating the causal effect of FLFP on corruption. After simultaneity is addressed, the positive relationship between FLFP and corruption remains powerful, with the respective coefficient settling on a value of 0.003. Magnusson (2010) , the weakiv command is applied in Stata.
f Following Kleibergen and Paap (2006) and Kleibergen and Schaffer (2007) , the ranktest command produces the Kleibergen-Paap statistic.
g Results from overidentification tests following 2SLS regression (using the overid command in Stata). This result is consistent throughout a number of alternative estimations, suggesting a higher FLFP rate may indeed decrease corruption levels. Nevertheless, given the time-invariant structure of our instrumental variables, we are unable to control for other, potentially confounding forms of endogeneity, such as measurement error or omitted variables.
